United States Nuclear Weapons Program: The Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead
Citation: Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-0-87168-715-9 ©Copyright 2007 American Association for the Advancement of Science AAAS Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy 1200 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 USA Document: Click to download
Please contact Benn Tannenbaum for a printed copy of the report.
Stockpile stewardship has satisfactorily maintained U.S. nuclear weapons for nearly 15 years without nuclear testing. Sustaining this record will require a continuation of the commitment to the scientific facilities and staff at the National Laboratories and modernization of the production complex (whether or not the stockpile includes Reliable Replacement Warheads [RRWs] in addition to legacy weapons that have undergone life extension programs [LEPs]).
Data on aging are obtained through surveillance of the stockpile and from laboratory studies, such as the recent work on plutonium. The appearance of age-related defects in the surveillance data on older systems has led some observers to postulate that a "frequent repair" period may be approaching in the future, but it has not yet been seen. Although the progress in both experiments and computational modeling in the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has been extensive, it is not yet sufficiently mature to predict future aging of the stockpile. The study of aging will remain largely empirical.
The recent study on plutonium aging indicates that plutonium pits may last considerably longer than could be inferred from previous data. The lifetimes of pits may be limited by chemical processes, such as corrosion of pit materials. Although these findings imply a longer useful lifetime of pits and warheads, at some point, the United States would have to build or rebuild warheads and produce certifiable pits if it is to maintain a reliable nuclear arsenal.
The independent designs for the first RRW could lead to a final design that is certifiable without a nuclear test. The design for the first proposed RRW is being completed and the selection of Lawrence Livermore as the lead laboratory for that process was announced on March 2, 2007. Both the certification of that design and the method of certification, however, still need to go through a rigorous implementation and demonstration process.
Although the first RRW could act as a catalyst for modernizing the complex, the process would present significant challenges. The first RRW is scheduled to be produced in 2012 at existing facilities that are expected to operate at a much higher level than they have demonstrated in recent years (especially the pit production facility at Los Alamos).
The refurbishment of the production complex requires a formal environmental impact process (per the National Environmental Policy Act), and that process has just begun. The riskiest period for the complex will be during the next two or more decades when the following activities will all be taking place at many sites: construction, ongoing surveillance, maintenance, LEPs, and potentially building RRWs. Although an RRW-based stockpile might make this process easier in terms of the final complex, it could make the transition more difficult because of the increased workload associated with building the new weapons and fixing their possible birth defects.
The costs associated with continuing refurbishment almost certainly will add to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE/NNSA) budget in the short term, unless the LEPs are significantly curtailed or other reprioritization takes place. The longterm savings envisioned for an RRW-based complex will depend on stockpile size and diversity, the operational environment, and the demonstrated efficiency of the new complex. Among these factors a major reduction in operational costs has the greatest potential for savings, but the track record is not encouraging in that regard.
The full engagement of the DOD is necessary to set the conditions under which an RRW can be introduced into the arsenal. This is particularly important for an RRW that does not provide a new military capability or respond to a mission need. Both the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council have endorsed the RRW concept as an essential first step. The technical standards, budgeting, and field-testing must now become an early and coordinated part of a joint planning process with the DOE/NNSA as it pursues its Complex 2030 vision.
Because of the above considerations, it is clear that the success of the proposed RRW program strongly depends on the engineering and project management skills of the DOE/NNSA in concert with the DOD. Most of the anticipated benefits of the program would occur in the long term through a more effective production complex and more easily maintained weapons with enhanced safety and security features. In the absence of detailed plans on scope, schedule, and costs, however, it is not possible to make judgments on the trade-offs in the weapons and the complex among stockpiles with varying mixes of legacy and LEP weapons and RRWs. Such assessments can be made only when stockpile requirements have been set and cost and schedule predictions have been made in response to those requirements.
If the RRW and Complex 2030 programs are pursued along their proposed paths, they will have a number of international impacts, including concerns regarding nonproliferation and arms control. Many of those concerns center on compatibility with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and issues such as whether the RRW is a new weapon. To respond, the United States should carry out a comprehensive assessment of those impacts and make a systematic effort to ensure that foreign perceptions of the programs are consistent with U.S. intent and its broad national security goals, including nonproliferation. Engaging the other major nuclear weapons states and states that depend on the United States for nuclear deterrence in those discussions would add credibility and value to the assessment.
Stockpile stewardship has succeeded politically because of the dual commitment to a sound nuclear weapons program and to one that proceeds without nuclear testing. Congress has provided initial legislation defining the framework for a potential RRW program. There are no presidential or cabinet-level statements from the administration that clearly lay out the role of nuclear weapons in the post–Cold War, post-9/11 world that make the case for and define future stockpile needs and that argue the case for the RRW. Based on experience, there cannot be a major transformation of the sort envisioned by the Complex 2030 and RRW programs without greater White House leadership to produce substantial bipartisan support. Because the transformation of the nuclear weapons complex is expected to take 25 years (i.e., several administrations and a dozen Congresses), a successful program will almost certainly require an approach that balances weapons program goals with those of nonproliferation and arms control.
Thus, there are risks in either long-term outcome—a stockpile that would be composed of all or mostly RRWs, or one that would be composed of all or mostly legacy warheads— and it is difficult today to weigh the pros and cons. There are some risks in even starting down a path toward a stockpile that has some (or many) RRWs. Pursuing the initial phases of this path could be a prudent hedge against the uncertainties of an all-legacy future and an opportunity that might result in the creation of a better long-term posture. It will be crucial to continually reevaluate the risks, costs, and benefits of these alternative futures—and to adapt accordingly. |
This document is categorized within these themes:
Nuclear Weapons
Reliable Replacement Warhead
American Association for the Advancement of Science
| This document is directly associated with the following: |
|
