Executive Summary

Since 2001, there has been a flurry of activity in the United States and international community regarding oversight of dual use life sciences research.  Dual use research is defined as beneficial research that may be directly misapplied for malicious purposes.  The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was established in 2004 to develop recommendations to the federal government for oversight and education of dual use research in the United States.  The 2008 Biological Weapons Convention Meetings of Experts and State Parties addressed oversight, awareness and education of dual use research and codes of conduct to prevent misuse of advancing biotechnologies.  The United Kingdom has recently started asking researchers seeking grants if they have considered the dual use implications of their research.  The InterAcademy Panel issued a statement providing principles for codes of conduct.  Researchers at the Australian National University have advocated mandatory education and training for scientists about the dual use dilemma.  The Israeli government recently passed a law regarding dual use life sciences research.  Most recently, the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, entitled World at Risk, calls for mandatory education of life scientists about dual use research and biosafety.  The recommendations found in this AAAS workshop report could guide the activities and/or policies of the federal government, scientific organizations, research institutions, and the international community on educating those working in the biological sciences on dual use research.

Two units of AAAS—the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy and the Program on Scientific Freedom, Responsibility and Law – have conducted a study of existing education programs for scientists that address dual use research and/or biosecurity.  The goals of this study were:

• to document and describe existing educational programs and materials on biosecurity and dual use research for scientists (information provided by course instructors);
• to provide recommendations for developing an educational program on dual use research; and
• to highlight major challenges in developing and implementing educational initiatives on biosecurity-related issues.

With the help of the Association of American Universities and university professors and administrators, we identified fourteen programs that specifically dealt with educating graduate or professional students in the biomedical sciences on dual use research issues.  We convened a group of experts in responsible conduct of research, bioethics, the life sciences, and biosecurity on November 21, 2008 at AAAS to review these educational programs and provide recommendations on how best to design and implement similar programs.  The existing programs discussed at this workshop educate graduate students working in the biological sciences about dual use research within the context of responsible conduct of research. 

In this workshop report, "scientists" refer to undergraduate and graduate students, laboratory technicians, post-doctoral fellows, and principal investigators in the life sciences, chemistry, physics, engineering, medicine, veterinary medicine, nursing, and public health who conduct biological research.  This workshop is one of four workshops on biosecurity education; the other three workshops will address biosafety, bioterrorism preparedness and biodefense policy.

Workshop Summary

At the AAAS workshop, participants discussed the benefits and challenges of educating graduate and professional students on dual use research via a range of educational methods and contexts.  There was clear consensus at the workshop that students learn best by active learning methods – including real-life simulations, case studies using real examples, small group discussions, and mentorship; that all scientists have a responsibility to consider the societal consequences of their research; and that funding is needed to develop and implement programs to educate scientists about the dual use dilemma.

Several tools (internet-based case studies or modules), methods for teaching (case studies, simulations, and small group discussions) and educational contexts (biosafety programs, mentorship, and responsible conduct of research) currently exist for educating students about dual use research.  Topics to cover in education programs range from a focus on the dual use dilemma to a broad array of information regarding biological weapons, biosecurity, bioethics, and dual use issues. Participants did not agree on a preferred method for teaching, but instead supported the idea that these programs should be flexible and allow institutions to tailor their program to best suit their researchers.

Workshop participants highlighted several major gaps and challenges:

• Lack of funding and time for development and implementation of education programs;
• Low levels of interest and knowledge of the dual use dilemma by senior scientists (the educators) and institutional leaders;
• Defining appropriate metrics for the impact of education programs on behavior;
• Shortage of case studies tailored to specific disciplines, such as bioengineering and nanotechnology, and to audiences including non-scientists, such as administrators and the public;
• Lack of educational tools to help scientists develop the skills needed to assess the risks and benefits of their research;
• Absence of data about how much and by whom dual use research is being conducted, and the nature of any ongoing contentious research; and
• Need to identify the target audiences and best approaches to educate them

 These gaps in knowledge and challenges should be considered when undertaking the development of educational programs about biosecurity and the dual use dilemma for scientists.