Taiwanese Bomb during 1970s (National Security Archive documents)
Website Description: Declassified Documents Show Persistent U.S. Intervention to Discourage Suspicious Nuclear Research
National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 221
Edited by William Burr
Washington DC, June 15, 2007 - The unfolding controversies over the Iranian and Korean nuclear programs show the extreme difficulty of persuading a government to reverse its nuclear weapons program. Newly declassified documents on U.S.-Taiwan relations during the late 1970s, published today for the first time by the National Security Archive, shed new light on the challenges of counter-proliferation diplomacy. Even a dependent ally, such as Taiwan, tried hard to resist U.S. pressures to abandon suspect nuclear activities and kept Washington guessing whether it had really given them up.
To ensure that the Taiwanese actually shut down what appeared to be R&D for a nuclear capability, the Ford and Carter administrations continuously exerted pressure on Taiwanese leaders to stop scientists and the military from engaging in research with weapons implications. For three years in a row, 1976, 1977, and 1978, the U.S. government secretly confronted Taipei over secret activities--such as uranium enrichment work and attempts to purchase reprocessing technology--that suggested ambition to develop a weapons capability.
Washington policymakers became so worried about the direction of Taiwanese nuclear programs that they took their concerns directly to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Amidst U.S. demarches, inspection visits by U.S. officials, and more detailed commitments by Chiang, U.S. intrusion reached the point where the Premier complained that Washington was dealing with Taiwan "in a fashion which few other countries would tolerate."
The declassified documents highlight three episodes:
- The summer of 1976, when U.S. concerns about Taiwanese interest in nuclear reprocessing triggered a U.S. demarche (protest) and a declaration by Taipei authorities that the regime would "henceforth not engage in any activities relating to reprocessing."
- January through April 1977, when a nuclear inspection team and IAEA inspector detected suspicious activities at the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) that raised questions about the direction of Taiwanese nuclear research. This led the State Department to demand far-reaching changes, especially the "reorientation" of the research so that it was more relevant to producing power than weapons. In April Premier Chiang acquiesced in a U.S. note demanding such changes.
- August-September 1978, as a U.S. nuclear team continued to monitor the INER and picked up worrisome signs that Taiwan had a secret uranium enrichment program. This led to a new demarche and a more authoritative statement by Chiang that his government "has no intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear device."
In 1988, ten years after Chiang made this commitment another flap over reprocessing emerged; it was quickly settled, but no doubt U.S. intelligence continues to monitor Taiwan very closely.
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This website is classified within these themes:
Nuclear Weapons
Global Security
National Security Policy
Nuclear Power
History of Science and Security
This website is directly associated with the following:
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